Abstract
article offers an empirical lens upon the accessibility of judicial appointment for women in the European institutional context. While there has been substantial scholarly writing on appointment processes, gender diversity and barriers for women judges in law and political science writings over the years, 2 much less attention has been paid to the terrain and the dynamics of international judicial appointment for women. 3 Invariably, it seems, a focus on gendered judging raises questions of legitimacy. 4 Unlike the conversation about the vast majority of courts gendered male, asking about women's representation (equal or not) instantly raises questions about the legitimacy of legal process in the presence or absence of the female judicial appointees. 5 In an oddly circular way, the very fact of paying attention to women judges (or the absence of women as judges) singles out the female judge (or potential judge) as the repre sentative of her sex, invokes (intentionally or not) the spectre of gender essentialism and results in a level of scrutiny for female judicial candidates and judges that their male counterparts rarely encounter on the basis of sex.
In offering some views that parallel Hennette Vauchez's article, I address two sepa rate matters. First, drawing on the insights of feminist perspectives on new institu tionalism, 6 I address the ways in which international judicial appointment processes function as an extension of the institutionalized culture being accessed. Second, I address the importance of feminist judging and the value of assessing why we should not only count the women who are appointed to international courts, but also pay attention to whether, in fact, there is any discernible commitment by women ap pointees to feminist method, practice and outcomes. 
I Institutional Encounters
There is a tendency, in the study of international institutions, as Barnett and Finemore have pointed out, to foreground the 'input' and 'output' of these bodies, and to pay little attention to the institutional cultures that sustain and enable their particular modalities of operation.
8 I take seriously the idea that the judicial appointment process constitutes part of the institutional culture of the European Court of Human Rights, and that the form, variance and performance requirements act as a barrier to and regulation of the entry of women to the bench -and arguably creates pathways for certain kinds of women who perform in particular ways.
Hennette Vauchez frames her analysis by reference to a cosmopolitan democratic citizenship, and its relationship to the legitimacy of international courts. In paral lel, I address the ways in which a comparative analysis of the politics of gender has brought fresh attention to the operation of legal and political institutions across the globe. 9 In paying close attention to the dynamics of political and legal institutions (including courts), we have a cogent means of determining what role gender plays in shaping institutional dynamics and how this 'influences institutional outcomes and opportunities'.
10 Attention to gender also reveals what Goetz terms 'gender capture,' which follows from men's historical and modern dominance of power positions within organizational structures. 11 In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, the process of application, appointment and judicial function trigger a set of expecta tions about both men and women's behaviour that dovetails with social norms based on accepted ideas and practices about femininity and masculinity.
12 Selfevidently, these norms are not static, and their dynamism is revealed when, for example, women seeking high judicial office conform to expected or typical masculine performativity as a means of affirming their mastery of and suitability for highly performative judicial office. In her analysis of 'selfpresentation strategies' by female candidates, the author uses curriculum vitae presentation as a way to address gender, uncovering both the elite profiles of the women who are candidates for the Court and advancing views on the ways in which 'they were actually more of a replica of the male international elite that was in the making '. 13 With that data in hand one might then unpack the ways in which the selfpresentation in these fora mandate certain scripts and de facto exclude The shaping is muted in Hennette Vauchez's article, focused on the specificity of external presentation in curriculum vitaes outlining women's suitability for high judi cial office. 15 Women do not stumble into judicial applications domestically or interna tionally. Those in the position to make an application are rightly observed to occupy privileged academic, governmental or policy positions, and yet all have functioned consistently and have advanced professionally in overwhelmingly masculine environ ments. Such women are likely to have been in a minority for much of their profes sional career, either the only (or one of few women) in any given professional room. Their tealeaf reading on the likely success of any foray into judicial appointment will be framed by a wellinternalized historical perspective where 'it is clear that the gains made (les acquis) are always fragile and that there are many risks of regression'. 16 Thus, it seems appropriate not only to address the scripts of professional qualification on their own terms but rather to understand them as framed by gendered assumptions and 'dispositions'. 17 In a way, it would seem useful to think of these selfrepresenta tions as indicating a form of bounded agency for women. In such contexts, by access ing elite judicial institutions, women exert agency by taking 'strategic, creative and intuitive action', 18 to generate individual opportunity as well as to enable dynamic entry to gendered institutional environments that have been, as a practical matter, closed to the female sex since their inception.
I take seriously the idea that the 'social stuff ' of international institutions, and particularly of courts, matters for women. 19 Here, the insights from Chappell and Waylen's feminist analysis of political institutions, which engages the very chal lenging task of looking within institutions for 'formal and informal practices', codified rules and unwritten expectations is an important aspect of thinking about when, how, why and with what outcomes women engage in institutional processes. Their insights are highly relevant to the microclimate of judicial selection. 20 The 'social stuff ' includes the performative entry points to closed masculine institutions, including formfilling, reference identification, engagement with national selection bodies and, perhaps most conspicuously, but not addressed in this study, the inter view process for judicial candidates. One does not need to be an appointed judge to encounter the testing grounds of presentation, authentication within terms acceptable to the institution and validation about fitting in. This corresponds to institutional analysis about the 'nestedness' of institutional cultures which project a 'logic of appropriateness' within institutional settings as well as the implicit under standing that rule following is a defining characteristic of the accepted institutional actor. 21 For the woman judge more than others, the testing may be particularly acute, given that presumptions about female care ethics in judging unlock profound questions about whether she will be suitable for 'internalization of accepted ways of doing things'. 22 Moreover, despite the formality of application, there are a host of informal institutional expectations and performance at play when any candidate, male or female, puts himself or herself forward for high judicial office. In a widely used definition coined by Helmke and Levitsky, informal institutions are understood as 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels'. 23 To fully understand the terrain upon which women make decisions (or not), to apply for high judicial office in the visible and high status arena of international courts, we must not only take the data we see presented by Hennette Vauchez, but also be curious about the requirements and expectations that are hidden. Despite their occlusion these elements exert enor mous practical influence on the decision to expose oneself to the scrutiny that will follow domestically and internationally.
While Hennette Vauchez's article addresses the 'getting there' portion of judicial selection process for women, we should not forget that there is an organic link between the means of access and one's subsequent experience on the bench. 24 The growth of international legal institutions has spawned a number of particular challenges for women and transnational feminist activism. Over a decade ago, Cynthia Enloe called on scholars to employ 'feminist curiosity' and address the institutional political cul tures of international war crimes tribunals. 25 The same curiosity is now usefully being diverted to the established international human rights courts. The encounter with institutions has increasingly incited feminist interest as scholars and practition ers become more attuned to the fact that getting there may now be less fraught than what happens once you have arrived. Thus, the routine practices and 'ways of doing things' are central to the ways of doing and experiencing institutions. 26 This chimes with Judge Tulkens' observation that we should not underestimate 'the difficulties encountered by women judges in the Court'. 27 Those experiences not only test the willingness to stay past their first term of appointment but may also have downstream effects on the willingness of women to apply, given better data points on the experi ence of being there overall.
The Feminist Judge
Gender operates as a process within institutions. This means that institutional gen der norms are not necessarily fixed and can be upended or nudged along to a dif ferent equilibrium. Thus, if the process of gendering institutions is bidirectional, it makes the matter of female judicial appointment to predominantly masculine spaces a rather more radical proposition, even more than theories of cosmopolitan citizen ship envisage. If institutions can be gendered, then as Beckwith notes, 'activist femi nists … can work to instate practices and rules that recast the gendered nature of the [institution]'. 28 Thus, one interesting feature of the analysis is the brief reference to the identi fication of a number of CVs that reveal a 'large proportion of women candidates for which distinctly feminist features were put forth.' 29 While candidates appear not to formally or affirmatively identify as feminist, close inspection reveals mem bership of female professional networks, organizations associated with women's equality and feminist scholarship. Arguably, if we are to go beyond a politics of presence in international judicial settings, a key element may be the commitment of judicial appointees to transformative politics, as well as to changing the insti tutional culture of the entity in which the judging takes place. 30 The challenge is enormous. As feminist theoretical and empirical work on gender and institu tions shows, 'gender relations are crosscutting … they play out in different types of institutions, as well as at different institutional levels, ranging from the sym bolic level to the 'seemingly trivial' level of interpersonal daytoday interaction, where the continuous performance of gender takes place'. 31 Hence, the work of the female judges involves not only holding judicial space in the formalized ritu als of judicial interaction but also addressing the hidden norms, practices and interactions that shape the value, meaning and status at the European Court of Human Rights. 27 Tulkens, supra note 5, at 594. 28 As much as the women judges may face challenges, the selfidentified feminist judge may be particularly tested. 32 As Justice L'HereauxDubé of the Canadian Supreme Court has noted, 'The idea of a woman on the bench may have gained acceptance … but the proper role for female jurists once they get there is still a work in pro gress.' 33 Feminist judges remain a rare breed domestically, and few selfidentified feminist judges have been appointed to international courts of any hue. 34 The barriers to female judicial appointment, much less the appointment of a selfidentified feminist judge, are underscored by the logic of appropriateness outlined above as well as the unstated assumptions that a feminist judge will bring uncertainty and unpredictabil ity to an established institutional order.
Conclusion
The current percentage of women judges at the European Court of Human Rights is 15 out of 47 judges (32 per cent). For a variety of reasons, at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, a number of women judges will leave the Court. It bears reminding that gendering and regendering legal institutions are 'active processes with palpable effects'. 35 The footholds gained by a certain tipping point of judicial female presence are not always distinctly marked in the jurisprudence of the Court. Nonetheless, when the four dissenting judges in a case addressing the prohibition on the use of ova and sperm from donors for in vitro fertilization are women, it marks a gendered, if not femi nist, space. 36 As Françoise Tulkens, retiring Belgian judge on the European Court of Human Rights, affirms in addressing the matter of female judicial difference:
[Female judges] do, however, sometimes and even often, bring 'something different'. Simply because they occupy a very different space because of their gender and other elements that form part of their own history. 37 The appointment process at the European Court of Human Rights does not safe guard a consistent or substantial presence of female judges on the bench. As a result, the influence of those women who are appointed may be barely visible, and, more problemat ically, legal institutions (like others) may learn to adjust and 'accommo date changes in membership while simultaneously disadvantaging the newcomers'. 38 These forms of disadvantage have been meticulously documented in political institu tions, showing how male elites shift the institutional locus of power from formal to informal mech anisms, and counteracting women's access by changing the spaces and places in which small 'p' power is exercised within institutions. 39 So, the challenges are manifold. It is evident that a multilayered approach to ensure the continued and consistent presence of a significant (if not equal) number of women on the Court mandates an ongoing attention to the broader institutional environment in which women will function if appointed as judges. Recognizing that the point of entry is as much an aspect of that structure as the daytoday takenforgranted rules and norms within the Court requires thinking in institutional terms and seeing institutionalism as an important dimension to advancing or limiting gender equality.
